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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-
3(2)(a)(2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Labor Commission erred in applying the plain language of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34A-2-413 (10)( 1997) that an award to an employee entitled to statutory permanent total disability 
benefits for loss of both legs, is not subject to re-examination for a claim of employability by the 
employer. A decision of the Utah Labor Commission based upon statutory construction is a legal 
ruling, review of which is de novo. Esquivel v. Labor Commission of Utah, 2000 UT 66 (Utah 
5/23/2000). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The determinative authority whether an employee is entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits is Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413(1997)(attached as Addendum D). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This petition seeks review of an order of the Utah Labor Commission denying the employer's 
motion for review of an order of Administrative Law Judge Barbara Elicerio, ("ALJ") providing 
continuing permanent total disability benefits. (Order Denying Motion for Review, attached as 
Addendum C). 
Course of Proceedings Below 
The Petitioner below ("Stephens") was injured in an industrial accident on September 8, 
1998, which resulted in the amputation of both legs just below the knee. (The facts are set forth in 
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the preliminary order of the ALJ, and the final order of the ALJ, attached as Addenda A and B, 
respectively hereto. Since neither party takes issue with the facts as found, recourse to the record is 
unnecessary, and the orders should be reviewed for correctness). Stephens filed an application for 
benefits, claiming permanent total disability benefits under U.C. A. §34A-2-413(10). (All subsequent 
references in this brief to "subsections" are to the various subsections of Section 413). Subsection 
10(a) provides that "the loss . . . of both feet. . . constitutes total and permanent disability, to be 
compensated according to this section" The following subsection, 10(b), provides that "A finding 
of permanent total disability pursuant toSubsection (10)(a) is final". The ALJ found that Stephens 
was entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The Appellant ("Employer") filed a motion for 
review with the Utah Labor Commission, which was denied. The Employer then filed a Petition for 
Review of the Labor Commission's order with this Court. 
Statement of Facts 
Stephens was injured in an industrial accident on September 8, 1998, resulting in the 
amputation of both legs just below the knee. Stephens was contacted by a vocational rehabilitation 
counselor provided by Employer. Shortly after, Stephens began taking college classes in computer 
engineering, paid for by Employer. While Stephens was going to college, on September 28, 1999, 
Employer decided it did not want to pay for Stephens education, and, instead, offered him a job 
doing telephone work. Stephens decided he did not want to stop his education, and refused the job. 
About one month later, Employer offered Stephens another job, as a dispatcher, which Stephens 
again refused. 
On February 1,2000, the ALJ made a preliminary ruling that Stephens would be entitled to 
his statutory permanent total disability benefits, regardless of his employability. In retaliation, 
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Employer stopped paying for Stephens education, forcing Stephens to get funding from the State of 
Utah. 
A subsequent hearing was held on the issue of re-employability. At that hearing, the ALJ 
found that "At best . . . . Respondents [Employer] have identified one job that the petitioner 
[Stephens] MAY be able to perform." The ALJ placed the word "may" in capitals, apparently to 
make clear that Employer's proof failed to reach a preponderance of the evidence. She further 
characterized Employer's evidence as "ambiguous", and noted that Employer failed to offer any 
evidence that the dispatch position it offered Stephens was "generally available" in the work force. 
The ALJ found that Subsection 10 permanent total disability cases are not subject to the re-
employment provisions of Subsection 7. On a motion for review, the Utah Labor Commission 
agreed, and ordered the Employer to continue paying permanent total disability benefits to Stephens. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is illogical to assume that the Legislature intended to exempt Subsection 10 applicants from 
showing an initial showing of lack of employability, only to allow the employer to assert 
employability by way of a post-award review. Further, the Legislature clearly disallowed employers 
from re-examining statutory permanent total disability awards in Subsection 11. Therefore, the 
Legislature has made clear that statutory permanent total disability awards be irrevocable. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE LEGISLATURE SPECIFICALLY EXEMPTED SUBSECTION 10 
DISABILITY CASES FROM RE-EXAMINATION FOR EMPLOYABILITY 
The Legislature provided in Subsection 11 that an employer may not re-examine a Subsection 
10 disability case for re-employment: 
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An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically re-examine a permanent total 
disability claim, except those based upon Subsection (10),... to determine whether 
the worker remains permanently totally disabled. 
U.C.A. §34A-2-414(ll)(a)(1997). 
The statutory language is plain and unambiguous. The courts will construe a statute in a way 
to give effect to all provisions of the statute. Employers Reinsurance Fund v. Ind. Comm. Of Utah, 
856 P.2d 648 (Utah App. 1993)("We have a fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to every 
word in the statute [citation omitted]").If re-examination of Subsection 10 cases for employability 
is allowed, then Subsection 11 is made meaningless. 
The reasoning for Subsection 11(a) is clear. A statutory permanent total disability claim is 
based upon permanent loss of limbs or eyes. No re-examination is going to change the fact that a 
Subsection 10 claimant has lost use of limbs or eyes. In Stephens case, for instance, no re-
examination is ever going to find that he has his amputated legs back. No rehabilitation is going to 
restore his missing feet. 
Alternatively, Employer attempts to divorce Subsection 11 from Subsection 7(b), and argue 
that while the employer may not re-examine the Subsection 10 claim under Subsection 7(a)(ii), it 
can provide a job instead of benefits. The problem with this attempted divorce is that a Subsection 
11 re-examination is to determine if the worker is still permanently totally disabled under Subsection 
7 in its entirety. Subsection 11 does not limit the scope of a re-examination to just Subsection 
7(a)(ii). If an employer can re-examine under Subsection 7 at all, and it can, it can re-examine under 
the whole Subsection. 
To accept Employer's argument would lead to an intolerable result. The practical effect of 
this argument would be to turn the employee into an permanently indentured servant of the employer. 
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If a statutory permanent total disability claimant were forced to accept a job with an employer instead 
of receiving benefits, the worker would be forever tethered to that employer. The employer cannot 
completely avoid its obligation by showing the employer is capable of "regular, steady work", as that 
would violate Subsection 11(a). So instead, the employer forces the worker into life-long servitude, 
at pain of losing benefits if the worker refuses the job with the employer. 
POINT TWO 
THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO RELIEVE A SUBSECTION 10 
APPLICANT FROM MAKING A SHOWING OF LACK OF EMPLOYABILITY, ONLY 
TO ADD IT BACK IN AFTER THE AWARD BY WAY OF RE-EXAMINATION 
Employer admits that a Subsection 10 applicant need not make an initial showing of 
unemployability. Employer admits that an injured worker suffering the listed injuries is entitled to 
an initial award of permanent total disability benefits. However, Employer's theory is that the 
employer can bring this issue through the back door after the award is made, by way of a showing 
of re-employability. Thus, Employer argues that the Subsection 10 employee need not make any 
showing of inability to perform "regular, steady work" to initially get an award, but immediately 
must avoid that same showing in order to maintain the award. This is illogical; if the Legislature 
intended to exempt the Subsection 10 employee in the first place, it surely intended to exempt that 
employee after the award. 
POINT THREE 
IT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE WORKERS COMPENSATION 
SCHEME TO COMPENSATE ACCORDING TO INJURY WITHOUT 
REGARD TO FUTURE EMPLOYABILITY 
To exempt Subsection 10 claimants from any reduction in award is consistent with the 
overall scheme of employee compensation for industrial injury. In the non-total disability case, the 
8 
worker receives an award based upon permanent partial impairment, without regard to actual loss 
of employability. For example, a loss of a finger might result in a complete loss of employability to 
a violinist, but no loss of employability to a lawyer or judge. The compensation is not tied to loss of 
income, but is a set amount based upon the relative severity of the injury, as expressed in percentage 
of impairment. If the employee never loses a day of work due to the permanent partial disability 
injury, the same compensation is awarded. The general approach is to compensate according to 
impairment, i.e. loss of use, without regard to any question of employability. The only exception to 
an impairment based award is Subsection (1), granting compensation for permanent total disability. 
Subsection (1) requires a detailed showing of inability to work, without regard to a specific level of 
injury. A Subsection 10 case is most like a permanent partial disability case, because the award is 
based on the severity of injury without regard to loss of ability to work. Thus, It is logically 
consistent to allow the employer to show rehabilitation, or to offer a part-time job in Subsection (1) 
cases, but not in Subsection (10) cases. 
This is the sad explanation that attorneys representing injured workers must repeatedly give. 
Workers call, explaining that they got a 5% impairment for a back injury, that completely disables 
them from all but minimum wage sedentary work. The loss of earning capacity may be enormous, 
but unless there is a basis for claiming permanent total disability, the worker is only compensated 
for that impairment, not the loss of earnings. 
POINT FOUR 
THE SUBSECTION 11 EXEMPTION FROM REVIEW IS A SPECIFIC 
STATUTE WHICH CONTROLS OVER A GENERAL STATUTE 
ALLOWING RE-EXAMINATION 
The Labor Commission denied the Employer's motion for review on the grounds that the 
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statutory permanent total disability is a specific statute, and the re-examination provisions of 
Subsection 7 are a general statute. The Labor Commission reasoned that since a specific statute 
governs over a more general statute, the provisions of Subsection 10 prevail. Craftsman Builder's 
Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 974 P.2d 1194,1999 UT 18, 1[54(1999)("A settled rule of statutory 
construction . . . provides that a more specific statute governs instead of a more general statute"). 
The relevant general category is that of all permanently, totally disabled workers. The specific 
subset of that general class is those workers who are entitled to permanent, total disability due to loss 
of two limbs or eyes. Thus, Subsection 10 targets a specific and smaller class of the larger group of 
permanently disabled workers. Since the specific provisions of Subsection 10 mandate that its award 
is final, the general re-employment or re-examination provisions of Subsection 7 do not apply at all. 
The Labor Commission quoted Larson's Workers Compensation Law, §83.08 as follows: 
Special statutory provisions may supersede the general principles controlling 
the relation between medical and wage loss factors in determining total disability. 
The commonest example of this type of statute is the familiar provision that certain 
combinations of losses of members shall be presumed to constitute total disability. 
The presumption may be prima facie or conclusive. A typical statute applies the 
presumption to loss or loss of use of both hands, both arms, both legs, both feet, both 
eyes, or any two of these.. .Under such a statute, depending on its wording, evidence 
of actual earnings would be either entirely immaterial, or would have to be 
extremenly convincing to overcome the presumption. 
The Commission noted that Utah's statute falls into the first category, where evidence of actual 
earnings is immaterial, and concluded that Stephens was entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits regardless of return to work. 
The Commission's position makes sense. As Point Two argues, the award of statutory 
permanent total disability benefits under Subsection 10 is similar to an award of partial disability 
benefits, in that it is awarded without regard to loss of earnings or earning ability. It is not logical 
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to subject such an award to the provisions of Subsection 7 regarding return to work. 
POINT FIVE 
THE EMPLOYER FAILED TO SHOW THAT STEPHENS WAS ABLE 
TO RETURN TO REGULAR, STEADY WORK 
The Employer has the burden under Subsection 11 of showing that Stephens was no longer 
disabled, and was capable of "regular, steady work". The ALJ found that Employer failed to present 
any evidence that the dispatch job it offered Stephens was generally available in the workplace. The 
ALJ stated that "at best" the Employer identified one job that Stephens may be able to do. The ALJ 
even put the word "may" in capital letters to indicate the lack of persuasiveness of the Employer's 
evidence. 
The ALJ contemplated a remand for further evidence if Stephens were to be subject to a re-
examination under Subsection 7. However, it is Stephens' position that the Employer failed to carry 
its burden of proof at the hearing, it should accept the consequence, through an outright affirmance 
by this Court, without a remand for further evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The Employer is faced with paying for a statutory permanent total disability claim to 
Stephens. Its initial plan was apparently to pay for Stephens to go to college, and then to tell him to 
get a job, and cut off his benefits. Once Stephens applied for a ruling on this issue, and won, 
Employer retaliated by cutting off funding for his schooling. Employer then offered Stephens a job 
as a dispatcher, again in an effort to get out of paying a Subsection 10 disability claim. 
The problem with Employer's efforts is that a Subsection 10 disability claim, by statute, is 
final, and not subject to review under Subsection 11, to allow a showing of employability under 
Subsection 7. The statute is clear, and Employer's liability is clear. To adopt Employer's argument 
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would turn Stephens into an indentured servant of Employer for the rest of his work life, allowing 
it to avoid paying disability benefits so long as it agreed to make up a job for Stephens. The 
Legislature gave no indication that it intended to turn Subsection 10 into a mandatory employment 
act for permanently injured workers. The petition for review should be denied, and the decision of 
the Utah Labor Commission upheld. 
DATED this 12th day of September, 2001. 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Attorney for Appellee/Petitioner Stephens 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of September, 2001,1 served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing APPELLEES' BRIEF upon the following, by depositing copies thereof in the United 
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Allen Hennebold 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
Theodore E. Kanell 
Robert C. Olsen 
PLANT WALLACE CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
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ADDENDUM A 
Preliminary Conclusions of Law and Order - February 1,2000 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Case No. 99648 
KYLE STEPHENS, 
vs. 
Petitioner, 
INTERMOUNTAIN SLURRY SEAL/ 
CNA INSURANCE, 
Respondents. 
* 
PRELIMINARY 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
* • • • • • • • * • • • • • • • • 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on November 29, 1999 at 11:00 o'clock 
a.m. Said hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of 
the Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The petitioner was represented by Kevin K. Robson, 
Attorney. 
The respondents were represented by Theodore Kanell, 
Attorney. 
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits related to a September 8, 1998 industrial injury. It is 
uncontested that the petitioner had both legs amputated below the knee, 
after a heavy equipment roller ran over his legs, at work, on September 
8, 1998. It is also uncontested that the applicable permanent total 
disability benefits statute, U.C.A 34A-2-413(10), requires a final 
finding of permanent total disability in this case, due to the 
petitioner's loss of both feet and/or legs. The issue that is in 
dispute is whether or not another section of the applicable statute, 
U.C.A. 34A-2-413(7), allows for cessation of the permanent total 
disability benefits, due to the petitioner's alleged current ability to 
return to regular steady work. The petitioner argues that, legally, the 
provision allowing cessation of benefits, due to ability to return to 
regular steady work, does not apply to "statutory"(i.e. specifically 
designated in subsection (10) of the statute) permanent total 
disabilities, like the petitioner's. In addition, the petitioner argues 
that, even if that provision does apply to the petitioner's case, he is 
not capable of returning to "regular steady" work, sufficient to provide 
for his needs. The respondents argue that the cessation provision of 
the statute applies to all cases of permanent total disability and that 
this is consistent with the main purpose of the revised statute, which 
encourages rehabilitation and return to work. 
PRELIMINARY ORDER 
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At the hearing, the ALJ did not take testimony. It was unclear 
if both parties were ready to present evidence on the disputed factual 
issue regarding the petitioner's ability to return to work and thus the 
ALJ indicated that she would reschedule to allow for a hearing aimed at 
presentation of evidence on this reemployment/rehabilitation issue. The 
ALJ found that the matter was at least ready for an order awarding 
permanent total disability benefits, since the statute requires a final 
order of permanent total disability, for the type of severe injury 
incurred by the petitioner. The ALJ finds that it is also appropriate 
to make a preliminary ruling on the issue of whether subsection (7), of 
the applicable statute, applies to subsection (10) permanent total 
disabilities. The parties made their arguments at hearing, on this 
issue, and the ALJ feels she understands the arguments asserted by both 
parties, so that a ruling can be made now. The ALJ will make it a 
preliminary ruling at this time. Because this issue is one of first 
impression and involves a threshold right-to-compensation dispute, the 
ALJ wants to make sure that her final ruling is made based on 
consideration of all the possible arguments. To allow for this, the ALJ 
will make a preliminary ruling now, but will reconsider this ruling at 
the time of the next hearing, if the parties present argument, at that 
time, that the ALJ has not considered in this order. 
ARGUMENT OF THE PETITIONER: 
The petitioner argues that subsection (10) makes it clear that 
the legislature intended that the severe loss of several limbs was to 
be compensated, without requiring the petitioner to establish the list 
of facts other individuals claiming permanent total disability need to 
establish. The petitioner argues that the legislature made a point of 
indicating that the finding of permanent total disability in these cases 
was "final" or not subject to reconsideration (subsection (10) (b) ) . In 
fact, the petitioner points out that the legislature went on to 
emphasize the finality of the finding in these cases, by indicating 
that the reexamination privileges (referring to the privileges granted 
employers/carriers to later challenge an award of permanent total 
disability benefits) , allowed in other permanent total disability cases, 
are not allowed in "statutory" (i.e. subsection (10)) cases. U.C.A. 
34A-2-413(11)(a). The petitioner argues that it makes no sense to 
disallow reexamination in statutory permanent total disability cases, 
if the employer can simply stop paying benefits, because it believes the 
petitioner is capable of returning to work. Considering the consistency 
in the statute, of exempting statutory permanent uonai cases from zhe 
challenges and hurdles provided for in other cases of permanent total 
disability, the petitioner argues that it is illogical and inconsistent 
to suggest that the "final" award of benefits can simply be set aside, 
if the petitioner is deemed capable of returning to work. 
PRELIMINARY ORDER 
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ARGUMENT OF THE RESPONDENTS: 
The respondents argue that the legislature clearly wanted to 
encourage reemployment when they revised the prior permanent total 
disability statute. The respondents argue that this was accomplished 
in the revised statute, by the trade-off of requiring employers to pay 
the full life-time award in permanent total disability cases, without 
assistance from the Employers Reinsurance Fund, but allowing employers 
to arrange for reemployment or rehabilitation of injured employees, so 
as to mitigate the cost of paying life-time benefits. The respondents 
argue that, to accomplish this trade-off of additional burden for the 
employer, subject to limitations, it is necessary to allow the 
employer/carrier to discontinue benefits, once the injured employee can 
return to work. With respect to statutory permanent total cases, the 
respondents argue that the legislature wanted to exempt these cases only 
from the requirement of establishing the initial list of elements and 
not from the requirement of inability to perform work. The respondents 
argue that the legislature intended that employers/carriers would be 
relieved of paying benefits in all cases where the injured employee was 
capable of returning to work, including statutory cases. The 
respondents argue that this intention is manifested in subsection (7) 
where it is stated that, after a final order awarding permanent total 
disability benefits, those benefits cease when the employee is capable 
of returning to work, with no special exemption specified for statutory, 
subsection (10), cases. 
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ preliminarily finds that "statutory," or subsection 
(10), permanent total disability cases are not, as a matter of law, 
subject to the subsection (7) (b) cut-off of benefits, when they are 
capable of return to regular steady work. There are several reasons why 
the ALJ finds, this to be the appropriate interpretation of the statutory 
language (absent any specific exemption stated in (7)(b) itself). 
1. The ALJ finds that, if the legislature had 
intended that benefits for "statutory" 
permanent total disability cases could be cut 
off, as with other cases, there would be no 
need to create a special category for these 
cases, as the legislature did in subsection 
(10). 
The respondents argue that the legislature wanted 
subsection (10) cases to be exempt only from the 
initial permanent total disability provisions in 
PRELIMINARY ORDER 
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subsection (1) (c) of the statute, but not from the cut-
off provisions of subsection (7) (a) (ii) . The ALJ finds 
this argument illogical. Using this interpretation of 
the statute, for purposes of obtaining an initial award 
of benefits, a subsection (10) case would be exempted 
from showing inability to perform other work than had 
been performed prior to injury. However, the 
subsection (10) case would then would need to establish 
the inability to work after an award of permanent total 
disability benefits, if the employer/carrier challenged 
the award under the subsection (7)(a)(ii) provisions. 
It does not seem logical to the ALJ that the 
legislature would want to exempt subsection (10) cases 
from a. requirement, only to place that burden back on 
the subsection (10) case, immediately after an award 
was made. It seems much more logical to presume that 
the legislature simply wanted subsection (10) cases to 
get benefits, without the need to ever establish total 
inability to work. To suggest that subsection (10) 
cases need to show inability to perform other work, 
either before or after an award, results in a 
conclusion that subsection (10) cases simply need to 
show what all other claimants need to establish. If 
this is the case, then there is no need for the 
subsection (10) special designation for loss of 
multiple limbs. The ALJ cannot accept that subsection 
(10) was added to the statute for no reason. Rather it 
seems more logical that the legislature intended some 
meaningful exemptions for those with extremely severe 
losses, i.e. exemption from the normal requirement of 
showing inability to perform all kinds of work. 
2. Since the legislature disallows the carrier to 
"reexamine" statutory permanent total 
disability awards, it appears the legislature 
intended that the awards be irrevocable. 
Subsection (11) (a) specifies that the reexamination 
rights, allowed to employers/carriers after an award of 
permanent total disability benefits is made, are not 
available to employer/carriers in subsection (10) 
cases. Since the legislature intended that there be no 
post-order investigation of employability in subsection 
(10) cases, it appears logical to presume that the 
legislature felt employability was irrelevant in 
subsection (10) cases. If the legislature wanted 
subsection (10) cases to be subject to the same 
subsection (7) cessation of benefits for employability 
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that other cases are subject to (as argued by the 
respondents), then it would seem illogical to disallow 
reexamination in subsection (10) cases. The more 
consistent interpretation of the disallowance of 
reexamination for subsection (10) cases, is that the 
legislature intended employability to be a non-issue 
for subsection (10) cases, both before an award, as 
noted above, and after award, as noted in subsection 
(11) (a) . 
For the consistency reasons stated above, the ALJ preliminarily finds 
that the award of permanent total disability benefits made in this order 
is not revocable under subsection (7) (a) (ii) of the statute. This 
finding/conclusion will become final at the time of the ALJ's final 
ruling/order in this case, unless revised or rescinded in the final 
ruling/order. The matter will be rescheduled for a hearing on the 
factual issue of the petitioner's current ability to return to regular 
steady work. This hearing is intended to resolve all factual issues 
that may be relevant to any appeal or request for review on a final 
award of permanent total disability benefits. 
BENEFITS DUE: 
Because of this preliminary ruling, or alternatively because of 
the subsistence benefits provision in U.C.A. 34A-2-413(6)(b), the 
respondents should continue paying the petitioner at the permanent total 
disability rate, until further order of the Commission indicating 
otherwise. It is presumed that the respondents have not discontinued 
paying benefits and that the respondents have been paying the benefits 
at the rate of at least the maximum permanent total disability of 
$414.00 per week. Benefits should continue at the $414.00/week rate. 
ATTORNEY FEES: 
Unless this award is rescinded or adjusted, the petitioner's 
attorney is entitled to the maximum fee award ($9,100.00), to be 
deducted from the award to the petitioner. Presumably, the respondents 
have never discontinued paying benefits, so there is no accrued award 
out of which an attorney fee award can be deducted. If this presumption 
is incorrect, the parties should notify the ALJ immediately. As a 
result of the absence of an accrued amount due the petitioner, the only 
way to pay the attorney is by a deduction or withholding from the on-
going weekly benefits. The petitioner's attorney should discuss the 
withholding with the petitioner to determine what amount he and the 
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attorney agree upon can be deducted from each payment for purpose of the 
fee. The attorney should then notify the ALJ regarding the amount 
agreed upon (no more than 20% of the weekly payments, but less can be 
agreed upon). The ALJ will do a supplemental order specifying how the 
attorneys fee will be handled or will include a provision in the final 
order specifying how the attorney fee should be paid. If the attorney 
or the petitioner have questions or concerns regarding the attorney fee 
award, they can contact the ALJ at the Commission. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, Intermountain 
Slurry/CNA Insurance, pay the petitioner, Kyle Stephens, permanent total 
disability benefits at the rate of $414.00 per week, beginning on date 
of injury, September 8, 1998, and continuing until the death of the 
petitioner or until further order of the Commission altering the award 
herein. The benefits should be paid less the deduction for attorney 
fees, the amount of which shall be specified in a later supplemental 
order or in the final order in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents pay Kevin Robson, 
attorney for the petitioner, the sum of $9,100.00, plus the percentage 
of interest that is appropriate per R602-2-4, for services rendered in 
this matter. This amount is to be deducted from the aforesaid award to 
the petitioner, in a periodic deduction, the amount of which deduction 
is to be specified in an order to be issued in the future. The attorney 
fees are to be remitted directly to the office of Kevin Robson. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case be rescheduled for further 
hearing on the issue of the petitioner' s current employability, with the 
parties receiving hearing notices indicating the date and time of the 
rescheduled hearing. 
DATED this 1 day of February, 2000. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review 
with the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion 
for Review must set forth the specific basis for review and must be 
received by the Commission within 30 days form the date THE FINAL 
DECISION IN THIS CASE is signed. Other parties may then submit their 
Responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days of the date of the 
Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included 
in the party's Motion for Review or its Response. If none of the 
parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Jj day of i t ID 2000, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, in the case of 
Kyle Stephens v. Intermountain Slurry Seal / CNA Insurance. (Case No. 99648) to the following 
parties: 
POSTAGE PREPAID: 
KYLE STEPHENS 
408 East 100 North #1 
Logan, UT 84321 
KEVIN K. ROBSON, ATTY 
5296 South Commerce Drive #100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
THEODORE E. KANELL, ATTY 
ROBERT C. OLSEN, ATTY 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple #1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1131 
Kathy Houskeeper 
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ADDENDUM B 
Final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order - November 2, 2000 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Case No. 99648 
KYLE STEPHENS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
INTERMOUNTAIN SLURRY SEAL/ 
CNA INSURANCE, 
Respondents. 
FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • * • • • 
2N D HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Room 334, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on June 8, 2000at 3:00o'clock p.m. 
Said hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The petitioner was represented by Kevin Robson, 
Attorney. 
The respondents were represented by Theodore Kanell, 
Attorney. 
PROCEDURAL STATUS OF LITIGATION: 
On February 1, 2000, the ALJ issued Preliminary Conclusions of 
Law and Order in the above-captioned matter, concluding that the 
petitioner was entitled to payment of permanent total disability 
benefits, regardless of what his capacity was for returning to work. 
Although the ALJ allowed for additional legal argument on that statutory 
construction issue, relating to the award of permanent total disability 
benefits, the parties presented no further argument on that legal issue. 
A second hearing was held as indicated above, to address the factual 
issues surrounding the petitioner's ability to return to work. This 
Order addresses the facts related to the petitioner's ability to return 
to work currently and affirms the ALJ's preliminary analysis and ruling 
on the legal issue (addressed in the prior order). 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Soon after the petitioner's September 8, 1998 industrial injury, 
in which he lost both legs just below the knee, the respondents had a 
vocational rehabilitation counselor/analyst review the petitioner's work 
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background and skills. The counselor/analyst issued a report, dated 
October 12, 1998, Exhibit D-4, which concludes that the petitioner had 
potential for returning to .work with his prior employer, Granite 
Construction/Concrete Products and also had transferable skills that 
would allow him to perform work in a number of occupations. Apparently, 
sometime in 1999, the petitioner began going to college, taking courses 
in computer electronj.cs, with the respondents funding this endeavor. 
The respondents indicated that they decided to pay for this 
rehabilitative effort, because they presumed that they would be relieved 
of the payment of permanent total disability benefits, once the 
petitioner was rehabilitated and returned to work. It is unclear why 
the respondents did not offer work or identify work for the petitioner 
instead. 
On September 28, 1999, the respondents offered the petitioner 
a job with his prior employer (Granite Construction, aka Concrete 
Products). This job involved primarily telephone work, per the job 
description submitted at hearing (Exhibit D-2). The salary level for 
the job is not indicated on the exhibit. About a month later, a second 
position was offered to the petitioner. This second position was a 
dispatcher position, paying $2,000.00 per month (Exhibit D-3). It 
appears undisputed that the position could be performed from a 
wheelchair. The position is apparently located in Ogden and would 
require the petitioner to travel from his home in Logan to Ogden each 
day. The petitioner indicated, at hearing, that his disability would 
not necessarily prevent him from making the somewhat lengthy commute. 
The petitioner stated that he wants to keep his residence in Logan, 
where his extended family resides, as this family has been supportive 
and helpful in his recovery from the work injury. The petitioner's 
salary in his prior position, as of the date of injury, per the 
application for hearing, was approximately $3,200.00 per month 
($18.00/hour x 22 days x 8 hours/day). The petitioner stated that he 
was in school when the jobs were offered and he wanted to complete his 
schooling. 
After the ALJ issued her order on February 1, 2000, the 
respondents discontinued payment on the petitioner's college courses. 
The respondents indicated at hearing that, since the ALJ's order 
indicated that the respondents would be liable for permanent total 
disability benefits for life, the respondents no longer had any 
motivation for rehabilitating the petitioner. The petitioner was 
disappointed and confused by this discontinuance of payment of his 
college, as the respondents initially encouraged him to pursue the 
education. Previously, the petitioner had been attending college 
classes 2 hours per day, 5 days per week, with about 3-4 hours study 
time per day,. The petitioner took a bus to and from his classes. 
Although he has a van with hand controls in it, so that he can drive 
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himself, the petitioner stated that the van does not run real well and 
probably needs a new engine, which he cannot afford. He stated that he 
was able to ambulate using a wheelchair, his prosthetic devices, or 
crutches. The petitioner wants to continue with his courses and thus 
he has arranged for payment of his education through the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services. 
The petitioner stated that he has been trying to manage without 
the wheelchair, as much as possible, using his prosthetic devices, but 
has been having problems with getting the devices to fit. He stated 
that his legs continue to shrink, causing gaps between his legs and the 
prosthetic devices. The gaps cause blisters. In addition, the 
petitioner stated he has begun to see a physician for severe back pain 
that is caused by use of the prostheses. The petitioner indicated that 
considering all the problems he has been having with the prosthetic 
devices, in order to return to work, he would need to rely exclusively 
on the wheelchair. He stated he would also need to be gone for a good 
portion of every work day, because he is currently getting physical 
therapy for 1-2 hours per day. It is unclear if this would be 
accommodated with paid leave time. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The respondents argue that the petitioner is capable of 
returning to regular steady work and thus his permanent total disability 
benefits cease, as indicated in U.C.A. 34A-2-413 (7)(a)(ii). As 
indicated in the ALJ's prior order, the ALJ concludes that this 
provision for cessation of benefits does not apply to subsection (10) 
cases, involving loss of both limbs. If this analysis is incorrect, and 
the petitioner's benefits are subject to cessation per subsection 
(7) (a) (ii), the ALJ finds that the evidence of the petitioner's ability 
to return to ''regular, steady work" is somewhat inconclusive at this 
point. At best, the ALJ finds that the respondents have identified one 
job that the petitioner MAY be able to perform. The ALJ has the 
following questions regarding whether the petitioner can perform this 
job: 
1. Considering the petitioner's recent development 
of back pain, can the petitioner manage the 
commute from Logan to Ogden on a daily basis 
and can the petitioner manage confinement to a 
wheelchair? 
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How much accommodation in pay and leave will 
the respondents offer, to allow for the 
petitioner's treatment needs (i.e. physical 
therapy and physician appointments, etc.)? 
Is 2/3 of his prior income sufficient to meet 
the petitioner's income requirements, 
considering financial needs he will have that 
will not be covered by workers compensation 
insurance (for example: the cost of a new 
vehicle, so that he can make the commute)? 
In addition to the foregoing concerns about the petitioner's ability to 
perform the job in question, the ALJ has concerns regarding whether one 
job position opening that the petitioner might be able to perform 
translates to capacity to return to "regular, steady work." The 
respondents have alleged that the dispatcher position is "generally 
available" in the work force. This may or may not be true (no evidence 
was actually submitted with respect to the general availability of these 
positions), especially depending on the number and type of 
accommodations that may be necessary to address the petitioner's 
disability and complicating factors, such as back pain. 
Considering the above-noted concerns, the ALJ finds that if the 
Commission, or other appellate body, should determine that the 
petitioner's benefits are subject to cessation per subsection (7), as 
the respondents have argued, the matter should be remanded for further 
consideration of the petitioner's ability to perform "regular, steady 
work," at the point in the future, when this case may be finally 
decided. 
BENEFITS DUE: 
Because the ALJ has determined that the petitioner is due 
benefits, regardless of his ability to perform regular steady work, the 
ALJ will confirm the award of benefits made in the earlier order below. 
Attorney Robson has indicated that he and the petitioner have decided 
that the full amount of benefits shall go to the petitioner until 18 
months following August 2000 (February 2002). After that, the 
respondents should pay the petitioner his compensation rate ($414.00 per 
week) less 20% ($82.80 per week), or $331.20 per week, for 110 weeks 
($82.80/week x 110 weeks = $9,100.00), or until approximately March 
2004, thereafter returning to full benefit payment of $414.00 per week. 
Attorney Robson can arrange for a lump sum advance payment of his 
FINAL ORDER 
RE: KYLE STEPHENS 
PAGE 5 
attorney fees (most likely involving a discount to present value) with 
the carrier, if that is mutually agreeable to the parties. As long as 
this is arranged per agreement, the ALJ will not need to approve the 
particulars of this advance payment. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondents, Intermountain 
Slurry(aka Granite Construction and Concrete Products)/CNA Insurance, 
pay the petitioner, Kyle Stephens, permanent total disability benefits 
at the rate of $414.00 per week, beginning on date of injury, September 
8, 1998, and continuing until February 2002. Thereafter, to account for 
the attorney fee award below, the respondents shall pay the benefits at 
the rate of $331.20 for 110 weeks or until approximately March 2004. 
From March 2004 forward the benefit rate shall be returned to $414.00 
until the death of the petitioner or until further order of the 
Commission altering the award herein. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondents pay Kevin Robson, 
attorney for the petitioner, the sum of $9,100.00, plus the percentage 
of interest that is appropriate per R602-2-4, for services rendered in 
this matter. This amount is to be deducted from the aforesaid award to 
the petitioner, in a periodic deduction, as indicated in the preceding 
order paragraph. The attorney fees are to be remitted directly to the 
office of Kevin Robson. 
DATED this 2 day of November, 2000. 
Bartfara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review 
with the Adjudication Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion 
for Review must set forth the specific basis for review and must be 
received by the Commission within 30 days form the date this decision 
is signed. Other parties may then submit their Responses to the Motion 
for Review within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor 
Commission conduct the foregoing review. Such request must be included 
in the party's Motion for Review or its Response. If none of the 
parties specifically requests review by the Appeals Board, the review 
will be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 6TH day of November, 2000,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Settlement of Disputed Claim for Permanent Total Disability Benefits & Order 
for Approval, in the case of Kyle Stephens v. Intermountain Slurry Seal and CNA Ins.. (Case No. 
99648) to the following parties: 
POSTAGE PREPAID: 
KYLE STEPHENS 
408 East 100 North, #1 
Logan, UT 84321 
THEODORE E. KANELL, ESQ. 
ROBERT C. OLSEN, ESQ. 
PLANT, WALLACE, CHRISTENSEN & 
KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Ste. 1700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
KEVIN K. ROBSON, ESQ. 
5296 South Commerce Dr #100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Vilma Mosier 
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ADDENDUM C 
Order Denying Motion for Review - February 28, 2001 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
KYLE STEPHENS, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
INTERMOUNTAIN SLURRY SEAL 
and CNA INSURANCE, 
Defendants. 
Intermountain Slurry Seal and its workers compensation insurance carrier, CNA Insurance 
(jointly referred to as "Intermountain") ask the Utah Labor Commission to review the Administrative 
Law Judge's award of benefits to Kyle Stephens under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the 
Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.). 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Pursuant to §34A-2-413(10) of the Act, is Mr. Stephens entitled to continuing permanent 
total disability compensation? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the decision of the ALJ. The facts 
material to the issue now before the Commission may be summarized as follows. On September 8, 
1998, while working for Intermountain, Mr. Stephens was run over by a heavy equipmentrroller, 
resulting in amputation of both legs below the knees. Mr. Stephens received compensation for his 
injuries pursuant to §34A-2-413(10) of the Act, which provides that loss of any two body members 
constitutes a permanent total disability. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Section 34A-2413(10) of the Act provides: 
(a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both 
feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes 
total and permanent disability, to be compensation according to this section. 
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(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection 10(a) is final. 
The foregoing provision has long been a part of Utah's workers' compensation system. It 
has consistently been interpreted and applied as creating a conclusive presumption of permanent total 
disability. Such a provision is relatively common among the various states' workers' compensation 
statutes. As noted in Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, §83.08: 
Special statutory provisions may supersede the general principles controlling 
the relation between medical and wage loss factors in determining total disability. 
The commonest example of this type of statute is the familiar provision that certain 
combinations of losses of members shall be presumed to constitute total disability. 
The presumption may be prima facie or conclusive. A typical statute applies the 
presumption to loss or loss of use of both hands, both arms, both legs, both feet, both 
eyes, or any two of these.. . . 
Under such a statute, depending on its wording, evidence of actual earnings 
would either be entirely immaterial, or would have to be extremely convincing to 
overcome the presumption. 
As previously noted, Utah's statute falls in the former category, where evidence of actual 
earnings is immaterial. Consequently, Mr. Stephens is entitled to continuing permanent total 
disability compensation.1 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and denies Intermountain's motion for 
review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this o$ day of February, 2001. 
R. tee Ellertson 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
This does not mean that the parties cannot, by mutual agreement and with the approval 
of the Commission, enter into some other arrangement that commutes Mr. Stephens' right 
to continuing permanent total disability compensation in exchange for vocational training or 
some other reemployment plan. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days 
of the date of this order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of Kyle 
Stephens, Case No. 99-0648, was mailed first class postage prepaid this 2fi day of February, 2001, 
to the following: 
KYLE STEPHENS 
408E100N#1 
LOGAN UT 84321 
INTERMOUNTAIN SLURRY SEAL 
1000 N WARM SPRINGS RD 
P O BOX 30429 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84130 
CNA INSURANCE 
PO BOX 17369 
DENVER CO 80217-0369 
KEVIN K ROBSON 
BERTCH ROBSON ATTORNEYS 
1996 E 6400 S 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84121 
THEODORE E KANELL 
PLANT WALLACE CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 E SOUTH TEMPLE #1700 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Sara Jensc 
Support Specialist 
Utah Labor Commission 
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U.C.A. §34A-2-413 (1997) Permanent total disability - Amount of payments - Rehabilitation 
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(B) At interphalangeal joint 50 (c) Permanent partial disability compensation may 
(iv) Index finger not: 
(A) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with re- (i) exceed 312 weeks, which shall be considered the 
section of metacarpal bone 42 period of compensation for permanent total loss of 
(B) At proximal interphalangeal joint . . . . 34 bodily function; and 
(C) At distal interphalangeal joint 18 ("> be paid for any permanent impairment that 
(v) Middle finger existed prior to an industrial accident. 
(A) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with re- ( 7 ) T h e amounts specified in this section are all subject to 
section of metacarpal bone 34 ^he limitations as to the maximum weekly amount payable as 
(B) At proximal interphalangeal joint . . . . 27 specified in this section, and in no event shall more than a 
(C) At distal interphalangeal joint 15 maximum of 66-%7r of the state average weekly wage at the 
(vi) Ring finger " t * m e ° f t n e injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be 
(A) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with re- required to be paid. 1997 
section of metacarpal bone 17
 3 4 A . 2 ^ i 3 . Permanent total disabil ity — Amount of 
(B) At proximal interphalangeal joint . . . . 13 payments — Rehabil i tat ion. 
(C) At distal interphalangeal joint 8 (D
 ( a ) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from 
(vu) Little finger
 a n industrial accident or occupational disease, the em-
(A) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with re-
 p l o y e e s h a l l r e c e i ve compensation as outlined in this 
section of metacarpal bone 8 section. 
(B) At proximal interphalangeal joint 6 (b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disabil-
(C) At distal interphalangeal joint 4 i t v compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to 
(b) Lower extremity show by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) Leg (i) the employee sustained a significant impair-
(A) Hemipelvectomy (leg. hip and pelvis) ment or combination of impairments as a result of the 
156 industrial accident or occupational disease that gives 
(B) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less rise to the permanent total disability entitlement; 
below tuberosity of ischium 125 (ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; 
(C) Leg above knee with functional stump, at and 
knee joint or Gritti-Stokes amputation or below (iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease 
knee with short stump (three inches or less below was the direct cause of the employees permanent 
intercondylar notch) 112 total disability. 
(D) Leg below knee with functional stump . . . (c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, 
88 the commission shall conclude that: 
(ii) Foot (*) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(A) Foot at ankle 88 (ii) the employee has an impairment or combina-
(B) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's) .. 66 t i o n of impairments that limit the employee's ability 
(C) Foot midmetatarsal amputation 44 t o d o b a s i c w o r k activities; 
(iii) Toes ^ u ) the industrial or occupationally caused im-
(A) Great toe pairment or combination of impairments prevent the 
(D With resection of metatarsal bone . 26 employee from performing the essential functions of 
(II) At metatarsophalangeal joint . . . 16 t h e w o r k activities for which the employee has been 
(III) At interphalangeal joint 12 qualified until the time of the industrial accident or 
(B) Lesser toe (2nd 5th) occupational disease that is the basis for the employ-
(I) With resection of metatarsal bone . 4 e e ' s Immanent total disability claim; and 
(II) At metatarsophalangeal joint 3 ( l v ' t h e **?}»*" cannot perform other work rea-
,TTT, A, , . , u i i • • 4. sonablv available, taking into consideration the em-(III) At proximal interphalangeal joint . . , , ' b
 ± , ,. n ployees age. education, past work experience, medi-
/•nr^ AX J- x i • . u I i • • x -i c a l capacity, and residual functional capacity. (IV) At distal interphalangeal loint . . . 1 , , , ^ • -; " r 1 < x-xi Tx J- u-v*. 
/nt. A11 A A A x T i i • • x (d) bvidence of an employee's entitlement to disability 
(C) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints . . .
 b e n e f i t g o t h e r t h a n t h o g e ^ ^ u n d e r t h i s c h a p t e r a n d 
,. Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. if relevant, 
Miscellaneous
 m a y b e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e commission, but is not binding 
» 2ne ,e?f J e n u c l r e a t l o n 1 2 0 and creates no presumption of an entitlement under this 
(B) Total blindness of one eye 100 chapter and Chapter 3. Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
. ( C ) Total loss of binaural hearing 109 (2) For permanent total disability compensation during the 
(5) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed
 i n i t i a l 3 i 2 -week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-VM of 
equivalent to loss of the member. Partial loss or partial loss of the employees average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of limited as follows: 
the member. This Subsection (5) does not apply to the items (a) compensation per week may not be more than 85* 
listed in Subsection (4)(b)(iv). of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury; 
(6) (a) For any permanent impairment caused by an indus- (b) compensation per week may not be less than the 
trial accident that is not otherwise provided for in the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus 
schedule of losses ^ in this section, permanent partial $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
disability compensation shall be awarded by the commis- to a maximum of four dependent minor children, but not 
sion based on the medical evidence. exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a) 
(b) Compensation for any impairment described in nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at 
Subsection (6)(a) shall, as closely as possible, be propor- the time of the injury; and 
tionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in (c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly 
this section. compensation rate under Subsection (2Kb) shall be 369c of 
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the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the 
nearest dollar. 
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising 
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or 
before June 30, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for 
the initial 312 weeks of permanent total disability com-
pensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in 
effect on the date of injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be 
required to pay compensation for any combination of 
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and 
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A-
2-501 through 34A-2-507 in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the 
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate 
under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be 
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from 
the employee's employer, its insurance carrier, or the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at 
the applicable permanent total disability compensation 
rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all 
remaining permanent total disability compensation. 
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall com-
mence immediately after the employer or its insurance 
carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or 
Section 34A-2-703. 
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising 
out of and in the course of the employee's employment on or 
after July 1, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for 
permanent total disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be 
required to pay compensation for any combination of 
disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and 
Sections 34A-2-410 through 34A-2-412 and Sections 34A-
2-501 through 34A-2-507, in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the 
applicable permanent total disability compensation rate 
under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be 
recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier by 
reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future 
liability paid before or after the initial 312 weeks. 
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Sub-
section (2), the compensation payable by the employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after 
«in employee has received compensation from the employer or 
the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of dis-
abilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the 
Applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, 
to the extent allowable by law. by the dollar amount of 50% of 
the Social Security retirement benefits received by the em-
ployee during the same period. 
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total 
disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the 
parties, until: 
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a sum-
mary of reemployment activities undertaken pursu-
ant to Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemploy-
ment Act: 
lii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits 
to the administrative law judge a reemployment plan 
as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider 
reasonably designed to return the employee to gain-
ful employment or the employer or its insurance 
carrier provides the administrative law judge notice 
that the employer or its insurance carrier will not 
submit a plan; and 
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to 
the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipu-
lated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation 
and to review any reemployment plan submitted by 
the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsec-
tion (6)(a)(ii). 
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the administra-
tive law judge shall order: 
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability com-
pensation payments to provide for the employee's 
subsistence; and 
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or 
medical benefits due the employee. 
(c) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given 
credit for any disability payments made under Subsection 
(6Mb) against its ultimate disability compensation liabil-
ity under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. 
(d) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be 
ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the employer 
or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the 
plan is subject to Subsections (6)(d)(i) through (iii). 
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, 
medical and disability compensation benefits, job 
placement services, or incentives calculated to facili-
tate reemployment funded by the employer or its 
insurance carrier. 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable 
disability compensation to provide for the employee's 
subsistence during the rehabilitation process. 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall 
diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The em-
ployer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently 
pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the 
administrative law judge on the administrative law 
judge's own motion to make a final decision of perma-
nent total disability. 
(e) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that 
successful rehabilitation is not possible, the administra-
tive law judge shall order that the employee be paid 
weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. 
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the 
employee became permanently totally disabled, as deter-
mined by a final order of the commission based on the 
facts and evidence, and ends: 
(i) with the death of the employee; or 
lii) when the employee is capable of returning to 
regular, steady work. 
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or 
locate for a permanently totally disabled employee rea-
sonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job 
earning at least minimum wage provided that employ-
ment may not be required to the extent that it would 
disqualify the employee from Social Security disability 
benefits. 
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement 
and employment process and accept the reasonable, medi-
cally appropriate, part-time work. 
id) In a consecutive four-week period when an employ-
ee's gross income from the work provided under Subsec-
tion 17Kb) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier 
may reduce the employee's permanent total disability 
compensation by 507c of the employee's income in excess 
of $500. 
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(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier, a permanently totally 
disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, 
part-time work subject to the offset provisions contained 
in Subsection (7)(d). 
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding 
the part-time work and offset. 
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under 
Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8, Adjudication. 
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the 
burden of proof to show that medically appropriate part-
time work is available. 
(h) The administrative law judge may: 
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job 
that would require the employee to undertake work 
exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual 
functional capacity or for good cause: or 
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to re-
duce permanent total disability benefits as provided in 
Subsection (7)ld) when reasonable, medically appropriate, 
part-time employment has been offered but the employee 
has failed to fully cooperate. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the em-
ployee's rehabilitation is possible but the employee has some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent 
partial disability. 
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an 
employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless the 
smployee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemploy-
ment plan under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss 
without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the 
idministrative law judge finds that the employee fails to fully 
cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states specific 
indings on the record justifying dismissal with prejudice. 
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use 
of both hands, both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, 
or any combination of two such body members constitutes 
total and permanent disability, to be compensated accord-
ing to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to 
Subsection (lOXa) is final. 
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodi-
cally reexamine a permanent total disability claim, except 
those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or 
self-insured employer had or has payment responsibility 
to determine whether the worker remains permanently 
totally disabled. 
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than 
once every three years after an award is final, unless good 
cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to 
allow more frequent reexaminations. 
(c) The reexamination may include: 
(i) the review of medical records; 
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical 
evaluations; 
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilita-
tion evaluations and retraining efforts; 
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax 
Returns; 
(v) employee certification of compliance with Sec-
tion 34A-2-110; and 
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or 
questionnaires approved by the division. 
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for 
the cost of a reexamination with appropriate employee 
reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel 
allowance and per diem as well as reasonable expert 
witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the 
employee's claim for permanent total disability benefits at 
the time of reexamination. 
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reason-
able reexamination of a permanent total disability find-
ing, an administrative law judge may order the suspen-
sion of the employee's permanent total disability benefits 
until the employee cooperates with the reexamination. 
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total 
disability finding reveal evidence that reasonably 
raises the issue of an employee's continued entitle-
ment to permanent total disability compensation 
benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may 
petition the Division of Adjudication for a rehearing 
on that issue. The petition shall be accompanied by 
documentation supporting the insurer's or self-in-
sured employer's belief that the employee is no longer 
permanently totally disabled. 
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (HKfKi) dem-
onstrates good cause, as determined by the Division 
of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall 
adjudicate the issue at a hearing. 
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in 
medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the 
sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent 
total disability entitlement, but the evidence of the 
employee's participation in medically appropriate, 
part-time work under Subsection (7) may be consid-
ered in the reexamination or hearing with other 
evidence relating to the employee's status and condi-
tion. 
(g) In accordance writh Section 34A-1-309. the admin-
istrative law judge may award reasonable attorneys fees 
to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the 
employee's interests with respect to reexamination of the 
permanent total disability finding, except if the employee 
does not prevail, the attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. 
The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its 
insurance carrier in addition to the permanent total 
disability compensation benefits due. 
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication 
if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer, self-insured 
employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall con-
tinue to pay the permanent total disability compensation 
benefits due the employee. 
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the 
remainder of this section shall be given effect without the 
invalid provision or application. 1997 
34A-2-414. Benefits in case of death — Distribution of 
award to dependents — Death of dependents 
— Remarriage of surviving spouse . 
(1) (a) The benefits in case of death shall be paid to one or 
more of the dependents of the decedent for the benefit of 
all the dependents, as may be determined by an admin-
istrative lawT judge. 
(b) The administrative law judge may apportion the 
benefits among the dependents in the manner that the 
administrative law judge considers jus t and equitable. 
(c) Payment to a dependent subsequent in right may be 
made, if the administrative law judge considers it proper, 
and shall operate to discharge all other claims. 
(2) The dependents, or persons to whom benefits are paid, 
shall apply the same to the use of the several beneficiaries 
thereof in compliance with the finding and direction of the 
administrative law judge. 
(3) In all cases of death when: 
(a) the dependents are a surviving spouse and one or 
more minor children, it shall be sufficient for the surviv-
ing spouse to make application to the Division of Adjudi-
